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SECEDING IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY: A PARADIGM FOR THE AGES 
Robert Trisotto* 
“Any people anywhere, being inclined and having the power, have the 
right to rise up, and shake off the existing government, and form a new 
one that suits them better. This is a most valuable—a most sacred 
right—a right, which we hope and believe, is to liberate the world.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
n August 30, 1999, the people of East Timor prepared for a refe-
rendum on the country’s constitutional status in a fight for self-
determination against a background of genocide, injustice, and betrayal.2 
“[N]o place on earth was [as] defiled and abused by murderous forces, in 
collaboration with the ‘international community,’ as East Timor,” wrote 
one commentator.3 “We are dying as a people,” wrote the head of the 
Catholic Church in East Timor in a letter to the United Nations’ Secre-
tary-General.4 At least one-third of East Timor’s population have died 
under the Indonesian occupation.5 Yet, in what has been described as “a 
showing of courage and determination, the people of East Timor turned 
                                                                                                             
 *  New York Law School J.D. 2009, Magna Cum Laude. This article has been 
awarded the Otto L. Walter Distinguished Writing Award from New York Law School, 
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 1. President Abraham Lincoln, Address before the United States House of Repre-
sentatives on the War with Mexico (Jan. 12, 1848), in 1 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 431, 438 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) (Abraham Lincoln commenting 
on the war with Mexico in 1848). 
 2. José Ramos-Horta, Preface to THE EAST TIMOR QUESTION: THE STRUGGLE FOR 
INDEPENDENCE FROM INDONESIA xiii, xiii (Paul Hainsworth & Stephen McCloskey eds., 
2000); see also Seth Mydans, With More Broken Promises of Peace, East Timor Votes, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1999, at A3 (stating that the vote by the people of East Timor on 
August 30, 1999, would determine whether the territory would become a sovereign state). 
 3. John Pilger, Foreword to THE EAST TIMOR QUESTION: THE STRUGGLE FOR 
INDEPENDENCE FROM INDONESIA ix, ix (Paul Hainsworth & Stephen McCloskey eds., 
2000) (stating the situation in East Timor “is one of the great and, until recently, unre-
cognized crimes of the twentieth century.”). 
 4. Id. (quoting a 1989 letter to the United Nations’ Secretary-General by Bishop 
Carlos Felipe Ximenes Belo, the head of the Catholic Church in East Timor). But see 
Daniel Pascoe, The Role of the Catholic Church in Support or Opposition to the Indone-
sian Occupation of East Timor (1975-1999), 2006 CROSS SECTIONS 119 (2006) (discuss-
ing the view of the Catholic Church towards Indonesian occupation). 
 5. Stephen McCloskey, Introduction: East Timor – From European to Third World 
Colonialism, in THE EAST TIMOR QUESTION: THE STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE FROM 
INDONESIA 1, 4 (Paul Hainsworth & Stephen McCloskey eds., 2000). 
O
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out in massive numbers to vote” on the future of the territory.6 With such 
threats to a people’s fundamental rights, the question of when interna-
tional law should deem a people’s declaration of independence a lawful 
act is critically important. 
This Article will argue for a new method through which scholars, ad-
vocates, and other decision-makers can analyze the legitimacy of a popu-
lation’s declaration of independence. The current approach to such an 
analysis—making self-determination the main focus of claims to seces-
sion—fails to consider the circumstances surrounding secession and, the-
reby, fails to properly balance the importance of state sovereignty with 
that of self-determination.7 As an alternative, this Article develops an 
alternative method of analysis using a sliding scale inquiry with a novel 
concept: the “Political Liberty Triangle” paradigm. This new method 
seeks to improve the ability to assess the merits of secessionists’ claims 
and determine whether a group’s declaration of independence should be 
deemed lawful. 
The Political Liberty Triangle represents a stable, independent state. It 
is formed by, and is focused on, the relative importance of the concepts 
of sovereignty, self-determination, and secession. They constitute the 
three points of inquiry in this analysis and are considered in light of the 
context and particular circumstances surrounding a group’s claim to in-
dependence. This method considers the validity of the claim for indepen-
dence in light of factors such as the likelihood of a territory to become 
economically self-sufficient, the free will of a territory’s people, and the 
state’s behavior toward its people. 
This alternative analysis uses a sliding scale inquiry in conjunction 
with the Political Liberty Triangle. The sliding scale measures the legi-
timacy of a territory’s independence relative to the extent of that territo-
ry’s continued dependence. Some relevant factors that can shift a territo-
ry toward either dependence or independence on the scale include: hu-
man rights violations, attempts at peaceful negotiations, will of the su-
permajority for independence, economic self-sufficiency, and interna-
tional harmony.8 The weight given to each of these non-exhaustive fac-
                                                                                                             
 6. IAN MARTIN, SELF-DETERMINATION IN EAST TIMOR: THE UNITED NATIONS, THE 
BALLOT, AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION 11 (2001) (quoting a statement by Secre-
tary-General Kofi Annan to the United Nations Security Council on the result of the East 
Timor Popular Consultation on September 3, 1999). 
 7. See generally Int’l Peace Academy, Vail, Colo., July 13, 2001, Competing 
Claims: Self-Determination and Security in the United Nations (prepared by Simon 
Chesterman, Tom Farer & Timothy D. Sisk), available at www.ipacademy.org/media/ 
pdf/publications/competing_claims.pdf. 
 8. See discussion infra Part II.B.1–5. 
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tors will change depending on the circumstances surrounding each claim 
for secession. This method applies a totality of the circumstances ap-
proach to claims of secession. Furthermore, because the considerations 
comprised in the Political Liberty Triangle also hinge on context-specific 
factors, the international community should look to the Political Liberty 
Triangle in light of the “totality of the circumstances” surrounding a 
claim to secession. Ultimately, this approach is designed to remedy the 
under-inclusiveness of past methodologies. By focusing on the circums-
tances surrounding a group’s claim to secession, the international com-
munity may answer the question that has been side-stepped for decades: 
When is secession legitimate? 
To conceptualize the relationship between the Political Liberty Trian-
gle and the sliding scale of independence, the latter can be seen as a tool 
for gauging the stability of the former. When sovereignty and self-
determination are balanced in equilibrium, secession is not a legitimate 
act. As the scale slides farther toward independence, the triangle is im-
plicitly buckling under disequilibrium. When the equilibrium is thrown 
off, the triangle crumbles and secession becomes necessary to restore the 
state’s political liberty triangle, although the final result is two political 
liberty triangles—one resurrected for the original state and one new tri-
angle for the new state created from the seceded territory. 
Part I of this Article provides some background on the traditional con-
cepts of sovereignty and self-determination in order to explain their 
competing relation at opposite points of the political liberty triangle. Part 
II explains in greater detail the nature of the new prospective approach 
proposed in this Article and elaborates on the factors that should be con-
sidered in determining whether secession is legitimate. Finally, part III 
applies this new approach to East Timor’s and Kosovo’s past secession 
disputes as case studies, illustrating that while Kosovo’s 2008 declaration 
of independence was likely appropriate, a consideration of the totality of 
the circumstances renders it questionable whether East Timor should 
have been granted independence in 2002.9 Finally, this Article sets out a 
number of recommendations for transitioning away from the old para-
digm’s focus on self-determination. These recommendations hinge on 
the notion that, while considerations of self-determination explain why 
secession might be justified, such considerations cannot alone indicate 
whether secession is actually justified in a particular instance. The Politi-
                                                                                                             
 9. East Timor was granted independence on May 20, 2001. Firdaus Abdullah, Dr. 
Mahathir Assures East Timor Counterpart of Continued Assistance, NEW STRAITS TIMES 
(MALAY.), Aug. 13, 2002, at 1; Piers Akerman, Ragged Chorus Flies Timor’s Tattered 
Flag, DAILY TELEGRAPH (AUSTL.), May 30, 2006, at 20; Fabio Scarpello, Energy Deals 
Light the Way for Nation’s Future, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 7, 2007, at 14. 
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cal Liberty Triangle paradigm brings necessary analytical rigor to the 
latter inquiry. 
I. THE FRAMEWORK OF THE POLITICAL LIBERTY TRIANGLE 
The Political Liberty Triangle represents a stable, independent state 
and is conceptually formed by the notions of sovereignty, self-
determination, and secession. International law norms equate self-
determination and sovereignty as parallel interests.10 For example, the 
Charter of the United Nations states that one purpose of the U.N. is to 
respect the self-determination of peoples,11 and that the U.N. is based on 
the principle of sovereign equality of its members.12 Traditionally, claims 
of secession are based on violations of the right to self-determination 
within a sovereign state.13 
The following sections examine the relationship between sovereignty 
and self-determination in order to provide a more explicit understanding 
of the framework proposed herein. This framework is a building block of 
a methodology that supersedes the traditional approach to claims of se-
cession. 
A. Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity 
State sovereignty relates to a state’s claim to, and exercise of, authori-
ty.14 In terms of its continuous development, it is not an “immutable 
principle decreed in fixed form once and for all time,” but rather a con-
                                                                                                             
 10. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2; U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 1; Final Act of the 
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe 1(a)(I), 1(a)(VIII), 14 I.L.M. 1292 
(1975) (declaring both the respect for sovereign equality and the self-determination of 
peoples as principles guiding relations between states). 
 11. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2 (providing that one of the purposes of the United Na-
tions is “[t]o develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle 
of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures 
to strengthen universal peace”). 
 12. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 1 (providing “the principle of the sovereign equality of 
all its Members” as one of the organizing principles of the United Nations and its mem-
bers). 
 13. See, e.g., PATRICIA CARLEY, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, SELF-DETERMINATION: 
SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, AND THE RIGHT TO SECESSION, vi (1996) [herei-
nafter SELF-DETERMINATION REPORT] (stating that self-determination movements typical-
ly are the target of human rights violations); Viola Trebicka, Recent Development, Les-
sons from the Kosovo Status Talks: On Humanitarian Intervention and Self-
Determination, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 255, 260 (2007) (“[T]he exercise of self-deter-
mination would certainly lead to secession.”). 
 14. See DAVID P. FORSYTHE, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 20 (1st 
ed. 2000) (“[T]he idea of state sovereignty is a claim relating to proper exercise of public 
authority.”). 
2010] SECEDING IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 423 
cept “whose meaning and scope are subject to re-evaluation” by the in-
ternational community.15 As such, although sovereignty is traditionally 
associated with the idea of supreme authority, today, sovereignty must 
instead be evaluated in terms of sovereign equality, or equality among 
the states.16 
While during the Middle Ages, sovereignty was used to signify supe-
riority, the term did not exist as it does today.17 Although people in the 
Middle Ages had “a very strong sense of that concrete thing, hierarchy; 
they lacked the idea of that abstract thing, sovereignty.”18 Sovereignty in 
today’s sense emerged as a consequence of the formation of the modern 
state. First, the royalty acquired plenitude potestatis, or “the supreme 
power,” which meant that no authority was able to challenge them.19 
That power was further strengthened when the royalty began asserting 
territorial autonomy of their kingdom.20 Second, the royalty began to use 
law as an instrument to further their power, contributing to the estab-
lishment of the concept of sovereignty.21 Relying on the Roman law 
maxims such as quod principi placuit legis habet vigorem (“what pleases 
the prince has the force of law”), and si veut le roi, si veut la loi; car tel 
est notre plaisir (“what the king wills, the law wills”) the law was uti-
lized as an instrument of command.22 
                                                                                                             
 15. Id. (“[A] claim to [sovereignty is] to be evaluated by the rest of the international 
community. Thus state sovereignty is not some immutable principle decreed in fixed 
form once and for all time, but rather an argument about state authority whose meaning 
and scope are constantly subject to re-evaluation.”). For a collection of articles discussing 
sovereignty as a social construct that developed over time, see STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS 
SOCIAL CONSTRUCT (Thomas J. Biersteker & Cynthia Weber eds., 1996); see also 
STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 3 (1999) (pointing out that 
“[s]ome analysts have argued that sovereignty is being eroded by one aspect of the con-
temporary international system, globalization”). 
 16. See J. Samuel Barkin & Bruce Cronin, The State and the Nation: Changing 
Norms and the Rules of Sovereignty in International Relations, 48 INT’L ORG. 107, 110–
12 (1994). 
 17. For an interesting discussion of the notion of sovereignty as developed in the 
Middle Ages, see, for example, Walter Ullman, The Development of the Medieval Idea of 
Sovereignty, 64 ENG. HIST. REV. 1 (1949) and J. W. McKenna, The Myth of Parliamenta-
ry Sovereignty in Late-Medieval England, 94 ENG. HIST. REV. 481 (1979). 
 18. BERTRAND DE JOUVENEL, SOVEREIGNTY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE POLITICAL GOOD 
171 (1957). 
 19. Martin Loughlin, Ten Tenets of Sovereignty, in SOVEREIGNTY IN TRANSITION 55, 
58 (Neil Walker ed., 2003). 
 20. Id.   
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 59. 
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Accordingly, sovereignty has traditionally been associated with su-
preme authority23 and has essentially been thought of as the concept of a 
state’s right to exercise certain powers with respect to its territory and 
citizens.24 Sovereignty can be characterized by three concepts: internal 
coherence, external independence, and supremacy of law.25 A sovereign 
state is characterized by internal coherence and supremacy of law since it 
has the power to make law that is “supreme and ultimate.”26 Additional-
ly, a sovereign state is externally independent because a sovereign power 
obeys no external authority outside its own territory.27 Accordingly, 
states are only bound by those rules of law to which they have agreed to 
be bound, such as international treaties or customary international law.28 
Another relevant legal principle in our discussion of sovereignty is 
equality of states. This principle is based on the analogy of the status of 
men in natural law.29 In the words of Emer de Vattel, a representative of 
the natural law school of thought, “A dwarf is as much a man as a giant 
is; a small Republic is no less a sovereign State than the most powerful 
Kingdom.”30 
The Charter of the United Nations combines these two concepts of so-
vereignty and equality of states.31 The principle of sovereign equality 
                                                                                                             
 23. 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 122 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 
9th ed. 1992) (“Sovereignty is supreme authority . . . .”). 
 24. JOHN H. JACKSON, SOVEREIGNTY, THE WTO, AND CHANGING FUNDAMENTALS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 57 (2006) (Although “[t]he old ‘Westphalian’ concept in the con-
text of a nation-state’s ‘right’ to monopolize certain exercises of power with respect to its 
territory and citizens is in many ways discredited,” the “main characteristics are still 
prized and harbored by those who maintain certain views, perhaps fairly characterized 
‘realist,’ or who otherwise wish to avoid (sometimes with justification) interference in a 
national government’s decisions and activities by foreign or international powers and 
authorities.”). 
 25. Loughlin, supra note 19, at 59. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See generally Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
 29. See VA. BILL OF RIGHTS OF 1776, ¶ 1 (“All men are by nature equally free and 
independent and have certain inherent rights. . . .”); THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 104 
(The Liberal Arts Press, Inc., 1958) (1651) (“Nature has made men so equal in the facul-
ties of body, and mind.”). 
 30. EMER DE VATTEL, 1 LE DROIT DES GENS, OU PRINCIPES DE LOI NATURALLE, 
APPLIQUÉS A LA CONDUITE ET AUX AFFAIRES DES NATIONS ET SOUVERAINS 11 (1758), 
translated in THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW, APPLIED TO 
THE CONDUCT AND TO THE AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND OF SOVEREIGNS 7 (Charles G. Fen-
wick trans., The Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1916). 
 31. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 1. For a discussion on sovereign equality and the 
United Nations, see Bardo Fassbender & Albert Blechman, Article 2(1), in 1 THE 
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espoused in Article 2(1) of the U.N. Charter represents a profound 
change and a shift in the conceptual direction of the meaning of sove-
reignty.32 A report by the U.N. drafting subcommittee states: 
The Subcommittee voted to keep the terminology, “sovereign equali-
ty,” on the assumption and understanding that it conveys the following: 
(1) [t]hat states are juridically equal; (2) [t]hat they enjoy the rights in-
herent in their full sovereignty; (3) [t]hat the personality of the state is 
respected, as well as its territorial integrity and political independence; 
(4) [t]hat the state should, under international order, comply faithfully 
with its international duties and obligations.33 
Sovereign equality was purposefully adopted as a new term to take 
precedence over the term “sovereignty.”34 Sovereignty was given the 
position of an attributive adjective modifying the noun equality.35 This 
was intended to highlight the new concept of sovereignty as establishing 
a better community discipline between individual states and mankind.36 
B. Self-determination 
Self-determination is the ability of an individual or group to make 
choices free from the force of the institutional framework within which 
they live.37 The concept of self-determination is disputative in interna-
tional law because it challenges core principles of the international legal 
system.38 In particular, it challenges the sovereignty and territorial integr-
                                                                                                             
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 77, 87 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 2d 
ed. 2002). 
 32. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 1; see also Fassbender & Blechman, supra note 31, 
at 87–88. 
 33. Report of Rapporteur of Subcommittee I/1/A to Committee I/1, Conference on 
International Organization, Doc. 723, June 1, 1945, in THE UNITED NATIONS CONF-
ERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, SELECTED DOCUMENTS 483 (1946). 
 34. Bardo Fassbender, Sovereignty and Constitutionalism in International Law, in 
SOVEREIGNTY IN TRANSITION 115, 128 (Neil Walker ed., 2003). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Christian Tomuschat, Obligations Arising for States Without or Against Their 
Will, 241 RECUEIL DES COURS: COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 195, 292 (1993) (The two elements of sovereignty and equality 
provide for a “development towards greater community discipline” which is “driven by a 
global change in the perception of how the right balance between individual State inter-
ests and interests of mankind as a whole should be established.”). 
 37. ROBERT MCCORQUODALE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW xi 
(2000) (“Self-determination is primarily about the ability of an individual or a group to 
make choices free from the bounds of the institutional framework within which they 
live.”). 
 38. Id. (“One reason why self-determination is contentious in international law is that 
the concept challenges some of the core principles of the international legal system.”). 
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ity of states and interferes with matters that fall within the domestic ju-
risdiction of states.39 
Self-determination developed within the international legal system in 
the wake of the First World War.40 In 1918, U.S. President Woodrow 
Wilson, a key advocate of the right of the people to choose their own 
form of government,41 stated, “[P]eoples may now be dominated and go-
verned only by their own consent. ‘Self-determination’ is not a mere 
phrase. It is an imperative principle of action, which statesmen will hen-
ceforth ignore at their peril.”42 President Wilson’s views of self-
determination helped the concept become an accepted term of use in in-
ternational relations.43 
The establishment of the United Nations advanced the development of 
the concept of self-determination; the U.N. Charter mentions the “prin-
ciple” of self-determination twice44—although, both references are made 
in the limited contexts of developing “peaceful and friendly relations 
among nations” and protecting the principle of “equal rights . . . of 
peoples.”45 However, it has been noted that the reference to “peoples” 
presumes a group beyond states and encompasses territories “whose 
peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government.”46 
After its inclusion in the U.N. Charter, self-determination quickly 
evolved from a principle to a right.47 The most significant document in 
                                                                                                             
 39. Id. (“It [(self-determination)] challenges the sovereignty of states and their terri-
torial integrity, it interferes in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of states . . . .”). 
 40. Id. at xiii. (stating that self-determination developed in an international context 
during the immediate wake of the First World War). 
 41. SELF-DETERMINATION REPORT, supra note 13, at 3 (“Wilson distinguished be-
tween ‘internal’ and ‘external’ interpretations of self-determination; the former, referring 
to a people’s right to choose its own form of government without outside pressure, was of 
far greater concern to him.”). 
 42. President Woodrow Wilson, Address to the Joint Session of Congress: Analyzing 
German and Austrian Peace Utterances (Feb. 11, 1918). 
 43. MCCORQUODALE, supra note 37, at xiv (“The long-term effect of Wilson’s views 
was that self-determination, despite its vague content and dubious conceptual basis, be-
came an accepted term of use in international relations.”). 
 44. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2; U.N. Charter art. 55. 
 45. See U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2; U.N. Charter art. 55. 
 46. Hurst Hannum, Rethinking Self-Determination, 34 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 11 (1993) 
(quoting Article 73 of the U.N. Charter). 
 47. See SELF-DETERMINATION REPORT, supra note 13, at 3 (“once [self-
determination] was written into the Charter, it very quickly evolved from a principle to a 
right.”); Hannum, supra note 46, at 31. 
[S]elf-determination has undoubtedly attained the status of a “right” in interna-
tional law. Formal statements by governments, the adoption by consensus of 
numerous United Nations resolutions, and the fact that more than half of the 
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the promotion of the right to self-determination is the 1960 U.N. Decla-
ration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial People (the “1960 
U.N. Declaration”),48 which makes it clear that all colonial territories 
have the right to independence.49 The “push for decolonization in the 
1960s . . . elevated self-determination to a right and brought to full light 
the need to contend with [the] humanistic components” of self-
determination.50 
However, given the trend in recent decades toward redefining self-
determination to apply beyond decolonization—i.e., so as to include 
every group as having a right to independence—the 1960 U.N. Declara-
tion may no longer offer sufficient guidance.51 For example, Kosovo and 
East Timor achieved independence after long and bloody struggles for 
self-determination.52 Currently, Chechnya is seeking its independence 
                                                                                                             
world’s states have accepted the right of self-determination through their adhe-
rence to one or both of the United Nations covenants on human rights would 
seem to confirm the existence of self-determination as a norm of international 
law. 
Hannum, supra note 46, at 31. 
 48. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 
G.A. Res. 1514, at 66, 67, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., 947th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/L.323 
& Add.1-6 (Dec. 14, 1960) (“All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue 
of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development.”). 
 49. Hannum, supra note 46, at 12 (With respect to the U.N. General Assembly’s 1960 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, “[t]he 
thrust of the declaration is clear: all colonial territories have the right of independence.”). 
 50. Lorie M. Graham, Self-Determination for Indigenous Peoples After Kosovo: 
Translating Self-Determination “Into Practice” and “Into Peace”, 6 ILSA J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 455, 455 (2000). 
 51. See, e.g., East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90 (June 30); In re Secession of 
Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (expanding the right to self-determination to apply to 
people who are deprived of self-determination by oppressive foreign occupying powers). 
 52. See Dan Bilefsky, In a Showdown, Kosovo Declares its Independence, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 18, 2008, at A1 (“The province of Kosovo declared independence from Ser-
bia . . . , sending tens of thousands of ethnic Albanians streaming through the streets to 
celebrate what they hoped was the end of a long and bloody struggle for national self-
determination.”); Barbara Crossette, Annan Warns Indonesians That Inaction May Lead 
to Criminal Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1999, at A6 (quoting former U.N. Secretary 
General Kofi Annan saying: “the people of East Timor are being terrorized and massa-
cred because they exercised their right of self-determination.”). 
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from Russia,53 and Western Sahara is in a struggle for independence 
against Morocco.54 
The 1960 U.N. Declaration was a product of its time, promulgated 
amidst a trend toward freedom and independence in a large number of 
colonial territories.55 It did not, however, allow for secession because the 
territorial integrity of existing states was assumed.56 Consequently, it 
does not address current problems that the international community faces 
with respect to secession. Today, in light of a trend toward independence 
for any group, it is necessary to have a conceptual framework for balanc-
ing the territorial integrity of existing states with the right to self-
determination. 
This shift is further evidenced in international declarations and cove-
nants created after the 1960 U.N. Declaration. For instance, the 1970 
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Re-
lations (the “1970 Declaration”) states, “[T]he subjection of peoples to 
alien subjugation, domination[,] and exploitation constitutes a major ob-
stacle to the promotion of international peace and security.”57 Further-
more, suggesting that a state erodes its claim to sovereignty when engag-
ing in subjugation, domination, and exploitation, the 1970 Declaration 
imposes limits on a state’s sovereignty when the state fails to “represent 
the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, 
creed, or colour.”58 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
                                                                                                             
 53. See Zbigniew Brzezinski, Op-Ed, Russia Would Gain by Losing Chechnya, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 19, 1999, at A35 (“The only fair and workable solution, good both for the 
Chechens and for the Russians, is self-determination for Chechnya.”). 
 54. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS IN WESTERN SAHARA AND IN THE 
TINDOUF OF REFUGEE CAMPS (2008), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/ 
reports/wsahara1208webcover.pdf (reporting that Morocco punishes Sahrawis who advo-
cate in favor of self-determination for Western Sahara). 
 55. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 
supra note 48, at 67 (“Welcoming the emergence in recent years of a large number of 
dependent territories into freedom and independence, and recognizing the increasingly 
powerful trend towards freedom in such territories which have not yet attained indepen-
dence.”). 
 56. See id. at 68; SELF-DETERMINATION REPORT, supra note 13, at 4. 
 57. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. 
Res. 2625 (XXV), at 121, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., 1883rd plen. mtg., Supp. 28, U.N. 
Doc A/8028 (Oct. 24, 1970). 
 58. Id. at 124. 
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or en-
couraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the 
territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States con-
ducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-
2010] SECEDING IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 429 
Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”) and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (“ICCPR”) also state that “all peoples have the right of 
self-determination.”59 This includes the right to “freely determine their 
political status,” and to “freely pursue their economic, social, and cultur-
al development.”60 
While scholars have written extensively on the right to self-
determination—what it encompasses, and to whom it applies—no inter-
national agreement currently exists to precisely define the scope of the 
right and identify who may exercise the right. Furthermore, states have 
been slow to acknowledge the right beyond the colonial context.61 The 
reluctance of states to expand the scope of self-determination and the 
lack of international consensus make answering questions relating to and 
depending on self-determination especially difficult. Until the issue of 
scope and entitlement can be ascertained through international agree-
ments or international norms, the legitimacy of secessions cannot be 
answered solely with self-determination. 
C. Secession 
Secession is “[t]he process or act of withdrawing,” such as when a 
people withdraw from their central government.62 Secession is largely 
the result of a state’s failure to balance its right to territorial integrity 
with its people’s right to self-determination. 
The concept of secession is inseparable from the concepts of self-
determination and sovereignty, the latter concepts being parallels in in-
ternational norms.63 The relationship between the corners of the Political 
Liberty Triangle becomes clear upon consideration of the following idea: 
when secession is intended, acceptance of one group’s claim to self-
                                                                                                             
determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a govern-
ment representing the whole people belonging to the territory and without dis-
tinction as to race, creed, or colour. 
Id. 
 59. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 
19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 60. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 59; International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 59. 
 61. See G.A. Res. 39/40, at 142–43, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/40 (Dec. 5, 1984); 
ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES (1995); Hannum, supra note 46. 
 62. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1470 (8th ed. 2004). 
 63. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2; U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 1. 
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determination results in the denial of another group’s competing claim to 
territorial integrity.64 
A balance is necessary between the right of the people to self-
determination and the right of a state to maintain a territorial integrity in 
order to alleviate conflicting policy goals. If the international community 
favors a state’s territorial integrity over its people’s right to self-
determination, the international community may potentially be complicit 
in limiting the freedom and liberty of that state’s people.65 Moreover, 
territorial integrity was not intended to preclude the right to self-
determination.66 Alternatively, too broad a reading of the right to self-
determination will compromise the territorial integrity of the state.67 
It has been argued that secession is permissible under a number of cir-
cumstances. Namely, secession has been thought to be justified in ex-
treme situations where “definite and substantial grievances” are present 
and “all other [means of resolving these grievances] have been exhausted 
or repudiated.”68 Among the prime considerations in evaluating a seces-
sionist claim are the history, nature, and severity of the existing griev-
                                                                                                             
 64. Hannum, supra note 46, at 41 (“Where independence is the goal, acceptance of 
one group’s claim to self-determination necessarily implies denial of another group’s 
competing claim of territorial integrity.”). 
 65. Brock Lyle, Blood for Oil: Secession, Self-Determination, and Superpower Si-
lence in Cabinda, 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 701, 707 (2005) (pointing out that 
“too strict a reading of territorial integrity creates an internationally sanctioned form of 
fascism, a nation where the people have no freedom to disagree.”). 
 66. Pius L. Okoronkwo, Self-Determination and the Legality of Biafra’s Secession 
Under International Law, 25 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 63, 80 (2002) (“The prin-
ciple of territorial integrity, however, was not intended to preclude people within a sove-
reign state from exercising their right to self-determination through secession.”). 
 67. Lyle, supra note 65, at 707 (pointing out that “too broad a definition of self-
determination makes it impossible to keep countries together.”). 
 68. Hannum, supra note 46, at 44–45 (citing Onyeonoro Kamanu, Secession and the 
Right to Self-Determination: An OAU Dilemma, 12 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 355, 359, 361 
(1974)). Hurst Hannum discusses the four principal arguments in favor of the right to 
secede. The first argument, the liberal democratic theory, “holds that, since the legitimacy 
of any government must rest upon the consent of the governed, the governed have the 
inalienable right to withdraw that consent whenever they wish.” Id. at 43–44. The second 
argument emphasizes humanitarian or human rights concerns. Id. at 44–47. The third 
argument indentifies a list of criteria that might be used in specific cases to evaluate se-
cessionist claims, and seeks to balance “the internal merits of the claimants’ case [for 
secession] against the justifiable concerns of the international community expressed in its 
calculation of the disruptive consequences of the situation.” Id. at 47–48. Lastly, the 
fourth approach, a territorially based test, considers the following criteria: the immediacy 
and and nature of the historical grievance of the secessionist group, the extent to which 
the group has kept its self-determination claim alive, and the extent to which the disputed 
territory has been settled by members of the dominant group. See id. at 48–49. 
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ances.69 For example, scholars have argued that secession may be legally 
justified when gross violations of human rights, such as genocide, occur 
within a given state or territory.70 
Additionally, scholars weigh the expected impact on international 
harmony in ascertaining the legitimacy of a claim to secession.71 While 
states may freely recognize the independence of a given population, ac-
ceptance of a group’s declaration of independence by the greater interna-
tional community increases the legitimacy of the right to secession.72 
Moreover, the promotion of international harmony requires a balancing 
of the right to secession and the adverse effects on the given state. Ac-
cordingly, it has been noted that “the basic question is whether separation 
or unification would best promote security and facilitate effective shap-
ing and sharing of power and of all the other values for most people.”73 
While a right to secession does not yet exist, it is an open question 
whether a right legitimizing secession under certain circumstances 
should be recognized. Because the legitimacy of any government rests 
“upon the consent of the governed, the governed should have the inalien-
able right to withdraw that consent whenever they wish.”74 This power to 
                                                                                                             
 69. Id. at 48 (citing Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Inter-
pretation, 16 YALE J. INT’L L. 177, 199–201 (1991)) (discussing the territorially based test for 
determining a right to secede). 
 70. Id. at 46 (discussing the humanitarian or human rights approach to determining a 
right to secede). 
 71. Id. at 47 (discussing the third approach to judging the right to secede); see supra 
note 68. 
 72. Clifton van der Linden, Secession: Final Frontier for International Law or Site of 
Realpolitik Revival?, J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL., Summer 2009, at 1, 6. 
Although recognition of the newly created state by the international community 
as a requisite component in the legality of secession remains in dispute . . . in 
political terms its necessity is almost universally accepted. As membership in 
the UN General Assembly is the preeminent signifier of international recogni-
tion of statehood, the UN can leverage substantial power insofar as it confers 
legitimacy on newly created states. 
Id. 
 73. Lung-Chu Chen, Self-Determination as a Human Right, in TOWARD WORLD 
ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF MYRES S. MCDOUGAL 198, 210 (W. 
Michael Reisman & Burns H. Weston eds., 1976); see also LEE C. BUCHHEIT, SECESSION: 
THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION 238 (1978) (arguing that the “final decision 
regarding the legitimacy of a particular secessionist claim must result from the balancing 
of the internal merits of the claimants’ case for secession against the justifiable concerns 
of the international community expressed in its calculation of the disruptive conse-
quences of the situation.”). 
 74. Hannum, supra note 46, at 43 (discussing the liberal democratic theory approach 
to determining right to secede); See supra note 68. 
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withdraw should arguably extend “not only to rejection of [a] particular 
government, but also to rejection of [an entire] state.”75 
II. A PARADIGM FOR THE AGES 
After juxtaposing the Political Liberty Triangle approach with the tra-
ditional paradigm, the following sections explain the methodology—and, 
ultimately, the desirability—of the former, in order to support this Ar-
ticle’s call for a paradigm shift. 
A. Rejection of the Traditional Paradigm of Self-Determination 
While self-determination explains why a group may be entitled to se-
cede, it does not guide the international community in determining 
whether an act of secession is lawful. Similar to a student of mathematics 
who is unable to use calculus without first understanding the fundamen-
tals of algebra, the international community is unable to evaluate the le-
gitimacy of a claim without the proper tools.76 While a student may rec-
ognize that a given problem can be solved using a particular calculus 
theorem, he or she will not be able to utilize the theorem without the re-
quisite tools. Similarly, scholars may recognize that self-determination is 
a justification for secession, but they are unable to analyze the legitimacy 
of specific claims for secession because a sufficient framework does not 
yet exist. 
If scholars—and, ultimately, members of the international legal com-
munity—possessed a more expansive analytical framework for looking 
at the legitimacy of secessionists’ claims, they could offer better collec-
tive judgments as to how to react. Some of the types of information most 
important to the decision-making process include: the occurrence of hu-
man rights violations; the occurrence of attempts at peaceful negotiation; 
clear expressions of the will of a supermajority to secede; indications that 
other rights violations are being perpetrated; and indications of whether 
the aggrieved population could be economically viable if secession were 
recognized as legitimate. 
Because such information is essential to fully evaluate the question of 
legitimacy, the international community should no longer focus on self-
determination to determine when an act of secession is lawful. Self-
                                                                                                             
 75. Hannum, supra note 46, at 43. 
 76. Cf. STEPHEN R. COVEY, THE 8TH HABIT: FROM EFFECTIVENESS TO GREATNESS 117 
(2004) (pointing out the calculus portion of the analogy—“you can’t do calculus until 
you understand algebra, and you can’t do algebra until you understand basic math”). 
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determination alone is not enough because it simply distinguishes legiti-
mate claims from illegitimate claims.77 
B. The Political Liberty Triangle Paradigm 
The international community must begin viewing secession in light of 
the totality of the circumstances. The extent of a people’s dependency on 
a given state body hinges on all factors relevant to the competing desires 
for self-determination or territorial integrity. Furthermore, determinations 
of the legitimacy of acts of secession should be made on a case-by-case 
basis because the circumstances arising in each case will be unique. This 
is why it is important to point out that the list of potentially relevant con-
siderations (provided above and discussed in greater detail below) is not 
exhaustive. The weight to be given to any one factor or circumstance is 
not fixed; the gravity of any type of consideration will always depend on 
the context and the interplay of all other relevant factors and circums-
tances. For example, the economic viability of a territory may be given 
more weight than the exhaustion of peaceable negotiations where a terri-
tory is small and its population uneducated. 
To further conceptualize this approach, it is best to think of these case-
specific factors as lying at the heart of the Political Liberty Triangle. 
Remember that as the sliding scale shifts from dependence to indepen-
dence on the basis of these case-specific factors, the triangle begins to 
crumble. 
Many scholars have already written about many of the factors that will 
be examined in this Article, but the forthcoming discussion aims to build 
and improve upon the existing scholarship. For example, it has been ar-
gued that serious human rights violations alone are sufficient to justify 
secession.78 However, this Article argues that this is not a facially ob-
vious conclusion—rather, evidence of such violations is but one of many 
factors that should be considered, in light, of course, of the surrounding 
circumstances of the territory. 
Unsurprisingly, most academic work dealing with secession has fo-
cused on self-determination.79 If nothing else, this Article will hopefully 
encourage a shift in academic discourse away from the self-
determination paradigm and toward a more meaningful, in depth analysis 
                                                                                                             
 77. W. OFUATEY-KODJOE, THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 162 (1977). 
 78. See ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: MORAL 
FOUNDATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 335 (2004); Okoronkwo, supra note 66, at 106 
(stating secession is permissible when serious human rights violations are present). 
 79. See, e.g., Milena Sterio, On the Right to External Self-Determination: “Selfis-
tans,” Secession, and the Great Powers’ Rule, 19 MINN. J. INT’L L. 137 (2010). 
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of the kind advocated here. Unfortunately, “paradigms, like traditions, 
die hard,”80 and a flawed paradigm can live on for centuries even after a 
better one is advanced.81 
1. Gross, Substantial, and Extensive Human Rights Violations 
Human rights are those fundamental moral rights necessary for indi-
viduals to live with liberty and dignity; moreover, they are a means to a 
greater social end.82 The legal system identifies and codifies rights that 
are considered fundamental,83 and States ensure autonomy and equality 
for individuals by recognizing, applying, and protecting the fundamental 
legal rights of individuals.84 
With the advent of international law, human rights have been interna-
tionalized and are no longer solely a matter of domestic jurisdiction.85 
Today, states are held accountable to the international community for 
their human rights violations.86 When a state fails to recognize and apply 
fundamental rights appropriately, victimized groups may seek assistance 
from the international community,87 and recognition of the legitimacy of 
secession is always a potential remedy international actors can offer. In 
                                                                                                             
 80. COVEY, supra note 76, at 20. 
 81. Id. 
 82. FORSYTHE, supra note 14, at 3. 
 83. Id. (“[I]t is the legal system that tells us at any given point in time which rights 
are considered most fundamental in society. Even if human rights are thought to be in-
alienable . . . rights still have to be identified—that is, constructed—by human beings and 
codified into the legal system.”); see also Jack Donnelly, The Social Construction of 
International Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL POLITICS 71–102 (Tim Dunne 
& Nicholas J. Wheeler eds., 1999). 
 84. FORSYTHE, supra note 14, at 3 (“[i]n the classical liberal view, the good society is 
based on respect for the equality and autonomy of individuals, which is assured through 
the recognition and application of the fundamental legal rights of the person.”). For a 
novel and creative approach to human rights violations, see Tai-Heng Cheng, The Central 
Case Approach to Human Rights: Its Universal Application and the Singapore Example, 
13 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 257, 259–62 (2004) (arguing for a more meaningful measure 
of human rights by focusing on different deviations from a central case of human rights). 
 85. FORSYTHE, supra note 14, at 4–5 (“Other developments also indicated the central 
point that human rights was no longer a matter necessarily or always within state domes-
tic jurisdiction. . . . Human rights had been internationalized . . . .”). 
 86. Id. at 4 (“In principle, states were to answer to the international community for 
their treatment of individuals.”). 
 87. See BENYAMIN NEUBERGER, NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION IN POSTCOLONIAL 
AFRICA 71 (1986) (stating a group may defend themselves by seceding from an oppres-
sive state); Onyeonoro S. Kamanu, Secession and the Right to Self-Determination: An 
OAU Dilemma, 12 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 355, 362 (1974) (arguing that a group may defend 
themselves when they are subjected to human rights violations). 
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such circumstances, the possibility of secession is a source of protec-
tion.88 
Human rights violations may provide a compelling justification for se-
cession.89 However, there is no general consensus as to what type or ex-
tent of violations are necessary to justify secession. For example, would 
it be sufficient to justify succession if there is a credible threat to the 
physical existence of an aggrieved population? What about extreme dis-
crimination against a particular group such that it results in significant 
oppression?90 What about genocide? Surely genocide should be suffi-
cient, right? 
While genocide is illegal under customary international law,91 one sin-
gle act of genocide against a population is probably insufficient to justify 
secession.92 In such a situation, secession may not be the proper remedy. 
For instance, the Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
states that “if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last 
resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, . . . human rights 
should be protected by the rule of law.”93 Additionally, long established 
                                                                                                             
 88. See Hannum, supra note 46, at 45 (stating secession is a form of self-defense 
while discussing the humanitarian or human rights approach to determining the appro-
priateness of the right to secede); see supra note 68. 
 89. See BUCHANAN, supra note 78, at 335; KAREN KNOP, DIVERSITY AND SELF-
DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 262–63 (2002); Hurst Hannum, The Specter of 
Secession: Responding to Claims for Ethnic Self-Determination, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Mar.–
Apr. 1998, at 13, 16 (“There are two instances in which secession should be supported by 
the international community. The first occurs when massive, discriminatory human rights 
violations, approaching the scale of genocide, are being perpetrated. If there is no likelih-
ood of a change in the attitude of the central government, or if the majority population 
supports the repression, secession may be the only effective remedy for the besieged 
group.”); Okoronkwo, supra note 66, at 106. 
 90. See Hannum, supra note 46, at 45 (reviewing the second approach to determining 
the right to secede which emphasizes humanitarian and human rights concerns). 
 91. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 702 (1987) (“A state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it 
practices, encourages, or condones . . . genocide.”). 
 92. See Hannum, supra note 89, at 16 (conditioning the right to secession on the basis 
of “massive, discriminatory human rights violations, approaching the scale of genocide” 
upon “there [being] no likelihood of a change in the attitude of the central government” 
or “majority population support[ ] [of] the repression.”). 
 93. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 
1st plan. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) (emphasis added). For a good discussion 
of the authority of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights since its enactment, see 
Tai-Heng Cheng, The Universal Declaration Rights at Sixty: Is It Still Right for the Unit-
ed States?, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 251 (2008). 
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principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity signal that secession 
may not be the preferable remedy.94 
When human rights violations are gross, substantial, and extensive, 
however, secession may become a legitimate goal for an aggrieved popu-
lation. As mentioned above, international agreements, such as the 1970 
Declaration,95 the ICESCR,96 and the ICCPR,97 suggest that respect for 
state sovereignty ought not to prevent the international community from 
taking action in opposition to state actors who commit serious human 
rights violations on behalf of their states.98 
2. Attempted Peaceful Negotiated Settlements 
There is a historical notion that violence rarely, if ever, produces viable 
and just outcomes.99 In order for a state’s Political Liberty Triangle to 
remain intact, a state should repudiate all forms of violence and pursue 
peaceful negotiated settlements. When a state uses violence and force on 
an aggrieved population as a method of settling problems, that state cor-
rodes its right to sovereignty.100 Likewise, the aggrieved population 
should also not resort to violence as a means of achieving its goal of se-
cession from the oppressive state. 
The establishment of the United Nations in 1945 signaled a movement 
away from violence and toward institutions that would promote peaceful 
settlement of disputes.101 Article 33 of the U.N. Charter states that “[t]he 
parties to any dispute, the continuation of which is likely to endanger the 
maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a 
solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, 
judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other 
                                                                                                             
 94. See, e.g., Rob Dickinson, Twenty-First Century Self-Determination: Implications 
of the Kosovo Status Settlement for Tibet, 26 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 547, 557 (2009). 
 95. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, supra 
note 57, at 121. 
 96. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 59. 
 97. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 59. 
 98. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 99. L. ALI KHAN, A THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: UNDERSTANDING 
ISLAMIC MILITANCY 287 (2006). 
 100. Trebicka, supra note 13, at 260 (“In the case of Kosovo, the exercise of self-
determination would certainly lead to secession, thus violating the principle of territorial 
integrity of the sovereign, Serbia. In this case, I argue that emerging international law 
should favor the right to self-determination over sovereignty claims.”). 
 101. See U.N Charter art. 39–51 (forbids the threat or use of force in international rela-
tions).  
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peaceful means of their own choice.”102 Furthermore, the U.N. Charter 
empowers the Security Council to resolve disputes that threaten interna-
tional peace and security.103 While the U.N. Charter is only binding on 
member states,104 the international community as a whole should follow 
the trend toward peaceful solutions to promote global harmony. 
Peaceful negotiated settlements should be the result of real bargaining 
by legitimate representatives of the parties after an examination of all 
issues that constitute the heart of the conflict.105 No party should be 
coerced or pressured into accepting an agreement, and when negotiations 
cannot produce a solution that is genuinely acceptable to both parties, the 
United Nations Security Council should assist in resolving the conflicts. 
The risk of intervention by the Security Council should encourage parties 
to reach agreements and settle their disputes in a peaceful way. 
3. The Will of the Supermajority 
Secession is not legitimate without the will of the people.106 Thus, ma-
jority support is often a very important element in weighing the legitima-
cy of secession. However, it is arguable that secession should be per-
missible whenever “reasonable demands for local self-government or 
minority rights have been arbitrarily rejected by a central govern-
ment.”107 According to much existing scholarship, the apparent sentiment 
is that evidence of majority support among all aggrieved individuals 
might very well be sufficient for legitimate secession.108 To demand a 
                                                                                                             
 102. U.N. Charter art. 33, para. 1. 
 103. U.N. Charter art. 23–38. 
 104. U.N. Charter art. 25 (“The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and 
carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.”); 
see also Shigeo Kawagishi, UN Economic Sanctions and Domestic Implementation in 
Japan, 89 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 344, 346 (1995) (“[n]onmember countries [of the 
United Nations] are not legally bound by the decisions of the [United Nations Security] 
Council.”). 
 105. KHAN, supra note 99. 
 106. See, e.g., Principles Which Should Guide Members in Determining Whether or 
Not an Obligation Exists to Transmit the Information Called for Under Article 73e of the 
Charter, G.A. Res. 1541, at 29, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/4684 
(Dec. 15, 1960) (“Free association should be the result of a free and voluntary choice by 
the peoples of the territory concerned expressed through informed and democratic 
processes.”); In re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, ¶ 87 (requiring the clear 
expression of the people’s will in a case of secession). 
 107. Hannum, supra note 89, at 16. 
 108. See, e.g., Jonathan I. Charney, Commentary, Self-Determination: Chechnya, Ko-
sovo, and East Timor, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 455, 464 (2001); Robert W. McGee, 
The Theory of Secession and Emerging Democracies: A Constitutional Solution, 28 
STAN. J. INT’L L. 451, 466–67 (1992) (citing FRANCES KENDALL & LEON LOUW, AFTER 
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simple majority, however, is not sufficient. Rather, to be deemed the 
“will of the people,” a claim should be a clear expression of a superma-
jority of the people.109 When a supermajority of all those who have been 
arbitrarily rejected by the central government express a clear will for se-
cession, the territory may become one notch closer to independence on 
the sliding scale. 
A supermajority is necessary, in contrast to a majority, because of how 
difficult it may be to gauge whether a mere majority of a population 
within a territory actually wishes to secede. The requirement of superma-
jority support is likely to guarantee that secession is the direct wish of the 
population within a territory. Furthermore, requiring a supermajority mi-
nimizes the risk of harm to minority groups, which must be protected 
when a population secedes from a state. Scholars have persuasively ar-
gued that the overall situation for minorities must not be worsened by 
secession.110 Indeed, secession should leave minorities at least no worse 
off than they were previously; meanwhile, secession might appear in-
creasingly legitimate, the greater the improvements to minorities’ cir-
cumstances in the new secessionist state.111 
The Supreme Court of Canada, addressing a claim of secession of the 
Quebec province, decided that the right to self determination must “be 
exercised by peoples within the framework of existing sovereign states 
and consistently with the maintenance of the territorial integrity of those 
states.”112 The Court, however, noted that there are extreme circums-
tances where a right to secession may arise.113 Of particular importance, 
while recognizing that it may not be “an established international law 
standard,”114 the Court stated that “when a people is blocked from the 
meaningful exercise of its right to self-determination internally, it is en-
titled, as a last resort, to exercise it by secession.”115 
Especially relevant to this analysis, the Canadian Supreme Court also 
discussed the relationship between the will of the majority and secession. 
In order for an expression of a desire to secede to be legitimate, the Court 
has said it would require “a clear expression by the people . . . of their 
                                                                                                             
APARTHEID: THE SOLUTION FOR SOUTH AFRICA 116 (Institute for Contemp. Studies 1987) 
(1986)) (associating the will of the majority of the group seeking secession with seces-
sion). 
 109. See In re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, ¶ 87. 
 110. See David Miller, Secession and the Principle of Nationality, in NATIONAL SELF-
DETERMINATION AND SECESSION 62, 72 (Margaret Moore ed., 1998). 
 111. Hannum, supra note 89, at 17. 
 112. In re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, ¶ 122. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at ¶ 135. 
 115. Id. at ¶ 134. 
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will to secede.”116 The court indicated that a clear majority of the popula-
tion’s vote on the question, free of ambiguity, would qualify as a clear 
expression.117 Accordingly, requiring the will of a supermajority to se-
cede would provide an even clearer expression of the majority of the 
population. 
4. Economic Viability 
Within the framework set forth in this article, the ability of a territory 
to be self-sustaining should be a prerequisite to secession.118 Given the 
simple fact that a state’s future and security are so closely connected to 
its economic viability, it is surprising how little discussion of secession 
has focused on the economic viability of a territory.119 Perhaps this factor 
has been ignored by scholars and academics because Article 3 of the 
1960 U.N. Declaration provides that “[i]nadequacy of political, econom-
ic, social[,] or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext 
for delaying independence.”120 Declarations, however, are not binding.121 
Additionally, in today’s world, globalization creates new economic chal-
lenges that were not known, and could not even be fathomed, at the time 
                                                                                                             
 116. Id. at ¶ 87. 
 117. Id. at ¶ 87; see also Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens, The Quebec Secession 
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 118. But see Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples, supra note 48, at 67 (“Inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational 
preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence.”). 
 119. See, e.g., Michael Hechter, The Dynamics of Secession, 35 ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 
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(2009) (discussing views on secession in UN declarations and resolutions). 
 120. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 
supra note 48 (emphasis added). 
 121. See Noëlle Lenoir, Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human 
Rights: The First Legal and Ethical Framework at the Global Level, 30 COLUM. HUM. 
RTS. L. REV. 537, 550 (1999) (“[T]he achievement of consensus on a declaration is a 
short-lived victory, because declarations are not binding and there is nothing to prevent 
states from later revoking the commitment they made when the text was adopted.”); John 
J. Maresca, Remarks, Human Rights: The Helsinki Process, 84 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 
122, 122 (1990) (stating, in reference to the Helsinki Final Act declaration adopted by the 
Conference of security and co-operation in Europe (“CSCE”), that it “entails political and 
moral commitments, rather than legally binding treaty obligations.”). 
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of the Declaration’s enactment in 1960. If a territory cannot survive as an 
economically viable state, then it should not legitimately secede, as it 
would likely fail as a state and become a burden on the international 
community. 
An independent state must be able to build a strong, healthy, and self-
sustaining economy to survive. Until its final status is resolved, however, 
a territory’s prospects for future economic development will be uncer-
tain. Businesses will be reluctant to invest in a territory where indepen-
dence has gone unrecognized, and international financial institutions will 
be unable to offer monetary assistance.122 
Still, one may be able to determine a territory’s economic viability to 
an extent by looking at its size and assets. For instance, rich natural re-
sources should indicate future self-sustainability. Additionally, a young 
population with a robust drive to succeed is more likely to contribute to a 
territory’s economic success. The amount of potential investment by the 
community, outsiders, and financial institutions will also lead to predic-
tions about economic viability. 
A great emphasis should be placed on the economic state of a territory 
in determining whether secession is appropriate. A territory that wishes 
to secede from an economically stable state should be self-sustainable 
and free from direction and assistance. 
5. Promotion of International Harmony 
A legitimate act of secession requires recognition from the internation-
al community.123 The formation of a state occurs, initially, as a matter of 
fact, and later, as a matter of international law.124 In other words, the 
formation of a state truly occurs upon recognition by the international 
community as a whole.125 While states are free to recognize any territory 
or population as an independent state, secession should not be considered 
                                                                                                             
 122. See The Balkans After the Independence of Kosovo and on the Eve of NATO En-
largement: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. 1 (2008) [he-
reinafter Kosovo Hearing] (statement of Rep. Howard L. Berman, Chairman, H. Comm. 
on Foreign Affairs) (noting, in regards to Kosovo, that “[a]s long as Kosovo’s final status 
remained unresolved, businesses were reluctant to invest there, and international financial 
institutions were unable to offer the needed monetary assistance). 
 123. K. William Watson, Comment, When in the Course of Human Events: Kosovo’s 
Independence and the Law of Secession, 17 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 267, 268 (2008) 
(stating that “[t]he viability of a state depends, in practical terms, on the acceptance of its 
existence by other international actors.”). 
 124. L. OPPENHEIM, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 544 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th 
ed. 1955). 
 125. See Watson, supra note 123. 
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a legal act without recognition by the larger international community,126 
as this promotes international harmony.127 Among other factors and poli-
cy considerations, a state will ultimately weigh the legitimacy of seces-
sion as a basis for determining whether to grant recognition.128 When a 
majority of the international community recognizes a state’s indepen-
dence, it is a statement of legality and legitimacy for the secessionist 
state. 
This argument, of course, ignores the dissenting states’ wishes. At first 
blush, one may grapple with the idea of promoting international well-
being when a portion of the international community will almost certain-
ly object to the legality of the secessionist movement. However, each 
state will take into account the adverse significant affects on the state 
being seceded from in deciding whether to recognize the secessionist 
state’s independence. Accordingly, recognition from the greater of the 
two halves is likely to promote international harmony. 
III. APPRAISING THE POLITICAL LIBERTY TRIANGLE PARADIGM 
In 2002, East Timor achieved independence from Indonesia, and in 
2008, Kosovo achieved its independence from Serbia.129 What follows is 
an appraisal of the methodology advocated in this Article as applied to 
East Timor’s and Kosovo’s previous secession claims. Using East Timor 
and Kosovo as case studies, the following sections will use the Political 
Liberty Triangle and the sliding scale of independence as tools for de-
termining whether the conditions in East Timor and Kosovo reached the 
threshold of legitimate independence, and whether Indonesia’s and Ser-
                                                                                                             
 126. In re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, ¶ 155 (“The ultimate success of 
such a secession would be dependent on recognition by the international community, 
which is likely to consider the legality and legitimacy of secession having regard to, 
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or withhold recognition.”); see also BUCHHEIT, supra note 73, at 238; Chen, supra note 
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 127. Watson, supra note 123; see also Eisuke Suzuki, Self-Determination in Interna-
tional Law, 89 YALE L.J. 1247, 1258 (1980) (reviewing LEE C. BUCHHEIT, SECESSION: 
THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION (1978)) (discussing the community interest 
achieved in recognizing secessionist states after weighing the potential disruption in 
world harmony resulting from separation). 
 128. In re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, ¶ 155; see also Watson, supra 
note 123, at 268 (stating states will likely base their decision to support the independence 
of Kosovo on realist political tactics). 
 129. See Bilefsky, supra note 52; supra note 9. 
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bia’s Political Liberty Triangles faltered to the point of rendering seces-
sion sufficiently legitimate. 
The history behind East Timor130 and Kosovo131 is extensive and com-
plicated. Because a complete discussion of the history of each state is 
beyond the scope of this Article, the analysis will focus only on the rele-
vant factors and circumstances at the heart of the Political Liberty Trian-
gle. 
A. East Timor 
On May 20, 2002, East Timor achieved its independence from Indone-
sia132 and became the first new sovereign state of the twenty-first cen-
tury.133 Starting in the sixteenth century and continuing well into the 
twentieth century, East Timor was a Portuguese colony. It was not until 
1975134 that the Indonesian government took control of the territory when 
the Portuguese government departed.135 At that time, the United Nations 
denounced the Indonesian means of exerting control over East Timor and 
continued to recognize East Timor as a “non-self-governing territory” 
under Portuguese administration.136 
                                                                                                             
 130. For a discussion on the history of East Timor, see TAI-HENG CHENG, STATE 
SUCCESSION AND COMMERCIAL OBLIGATIONS 171–208 (2006); GEOFFREY C. GUNN, EAST 
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DELUSION (Michael Waller, Kyril Drezov & Bülent Gökay eds., 2001); MIRANDA 
VICKERS, BETWEEN SERB AND ALBANIAN: A HISTORY OF KOSOVO (1998); U.S. Dep’t of 
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 135. East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, 96 (June 30). 
 136. Julie M. Sforza, Note, The Timor Gap Dispute: The Validity of the Timor Gap 
Treaty, Self-Determination, and Decolonization, 22 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 481, 
483 (1999); see also G.A. Res. 37/30, U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/30 (Nov. 23, 1982); G.A. 
Res. 36/50, U.N. Res. A/RES/36/50 (Nov. 24, 1981); G.A. Res. 35/27, U.N. Res. 
A/RES/35/27 (Nov. 11, 1980); G.A. 34/40, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/30 (Nov. 21, 1979); 
G.A. Res. 33/29, U.N. Doc. A/RES/33/39 (Dec. 13, 1978); G.A. Res. 32/34, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/32/34 (Nov. 28, 1977); G.A. Res. 31/53, U.N. Doc. A/RES/31/53 (Dec. 1, 1976); 
G.A. Res. 3485 (XXX), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3485 (Dec. 12, 1975); S.C. Res. 389, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/389 (Apr. 22, 1976); S.C. Res. 384, U.N. Doc. S/RES/384 (Dec. 22, 1975). 
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Extreme brutality and violence marked Indonesian rule over East Ti-
mor. The Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East 
Timor reported a minimum of 102,800 conflict-related deaths between 
1974 and 1999.137 This estimate is further supported by a comprehensive 
study commissioned by the Australian Parliament, which reported at 
least 200,000 East Timorese died under Indonesian occupation.138 
On May 5, 1999, the negotiations over the final status of East Timor 
resulted in Indonesia and Portugal signing the Agreement Between the 
Republic of Indonesia and the Portuguese Republic on the Question of 
East Timor. The agreement allowed the United Nations to organize a 
popular consultation of the East Timorese through a “direct, secret, and 
universal ballot.”139 Under the agreement, if the East Timorese people 
rejected the autonomous framework, Indonesia would transfer its au-
thority to the United Nations, and this would eventually lead to East Ti-
mor’s independence.140 
While the status of East Timor was never clear until the popular con-
sultation,141 nearly 79% voted to reject autonomous status in Indonesia 
on August 30, 1999.142 The consultation resulted in mass violence, in-
cluding “murders, massacres, disappearances, forced expulsion, rape, 
sexual harassment of women, and destruction of property” perpetrated by 
pro-Indonesia militias.143 Peace was not restored in East Timor until the 
U.N. Security Council authorized the creation of the International Force 
for East Timor (“INTERFET”) to quell the violence brought on by the 
                                                                                                             
 137. COMMISSION FOR RECEPTION, TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN TIMOR-LESTE, 
CHEGA!: FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION FOR RECEPTION, TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION 
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for Kashmir?, HUM. RTS. BRIEF (Ctr. for Human Rights & Humanitarian Law, Washing-
ton D.C.), Spring 2001, at 9, 10. 
 142. Timor Chooses Independence, BBC NEWS, Sept. 4, 1999, available at http://news. 
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/438145.stm. 
 143. Singh, supra note 141, at 10. 
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consultation,144 but not long after that, East Timor finally won its hard-
fought battle for self-government.145 
Did the international community achieve the proper result by granting 
East Timor its independence? At first blush, this sounds plausible. The 
people of East Timor suffered decades of violence, brutality, and exten-
sive human rights violations. Then, while the popular consultation 
evinced East Timor’s willingness to engage in peaceful negotiations, the 
resulting violence indicated that secession represented the will of the su-
permajority. Meanwhile, East Timor’s independence likely promoted 
international harmony. When Indonesia took control of East Timor, the 
United Nations’ Security Council and General Assembly adopted resolu-
tions recognizing the legitimacy of East Timor’s struggle for indepen-
dence.146 Since member states of the United Nations are bound by U.N. 
resolutions and the United Nations represents a considerable majority of 
independent states in the world, the U.N.’s resolute disapproval of Indo-
nesia’s occupation of East Timor arguably represented the view of the 
broader international community.147 At the time of Indonesia’s invasion 
in 1975, there were 144 member states of the United Nations.148 Accord-
ing to the U.S. Department of State, there are 194 independent states in 
the world.149 
Using the sliding scale approach, however, the lawfulness of East Ti-
mor’s secession is not as clear cut. Significantly, East Timor’s economic 
viability was in question at the time of secession.150 Commentators have 
pointed out, “[i]t was a belief that an independent East Timor was not 
economically viable that provided one of its justifications for incorpora-
tion into Indonesia.”151 East Timor is small, with few natural resources, 
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 145. Abdullah, supra note 9; Akerman, supra note 9; Scarpello, supra note 9. 
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and sparsely populated.152 Furthermore, years of war have left most of its 
people uneducated.153 In 1999, East Timor’s was among the poorest 
economies in the world154 and its infrastructure had been neglected or 
destroyed over the decades during Portuguese and Indonesian rule.155 A 
territory with such deterioration in its economical abilities may not be 
able to accept the responsibilities of statehood in the international com-
munity.156 
East Timor does, however, have reasons to be optimistic. While econ-
omists have estimated that it could take 15 to 20 years before East Timor 
achieves levels of economic growth comparable to those of Indonesia,157 
there is significant growth potential because the area is rich in oil and 
natural gas.158 Under the Timor Sea Treaty, which replaced the Timor 
Gap Treaty, East Timor is entitled to a share of the proceeds coming 
from petroleum found in the seabed area described in the agreement.159 
Additionally, East Timor’s agricultural, coffee, marble-mining, coastal 
fishing, and tourism industries also provide potential sources of econom-
ic development.160 
Still, despite this potential, East Timor has yet to prove it can be eco-
nomically viable.161 In 2008, East Timor’s success depended on interna-
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tional assistance, without which the area’s future would be bleak.162 It is 
debatable whether the people of East Timor are better off in a poor econ-
omy marked by starvation, high unemployment, and a high mortality rate 
than they would have been as a territory dependent on an economically 
self-sufficient state.163 As such, the circumstances surrounding East Ti-
mor’s declaration of independence may not have been enough to justify 
East Timor’s independence when considered under the more rigorous 
sliding scale approach. 
B. Kosovo 
In 1989, the Serbian government seized control of Kosovo164 and re-
tained control for nearly twenty years until the Kosovo Assembly de-
clared independence on February 17, 2008 in Pristina.165 Throughout the 
1990s, Kosovo was technically an independent part of Serbia,166 but the 
occupation was marked by Serbia denying the people of Kosovo the right 
to participate in government life and committing rampant human rights 
abuses including beatings, arbitrary arrests, and torture.167 
In the late 1990s, a violent resistance emerged in Kosovo, and it was 
met with a vehement response by Serbian authorities.168 While the U.N. 
Security Council issued Chapter VII resolutions demanding a cease-fire 
and peaceful negotiations with international supervision,169 Serbia re-
sisted efforts for peaceful settlements.170 As a result, the U.N. Security 
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Council adopted Resolution 1244 providing for U.N. administration of 
Kosovo.171 
Resolution 1244 established the U.N. Interim Administration Mission 
in Kosovo to promote democratic self-government and “facilit[e] a polit-
ical process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status . . . .”172 The 
duties of the U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (the 
“UNMIK”) also included performing civilian administrative functions, 
promoting human rights, coordinating humanitarian relief and the recon-
struction of infrastructure, maintaining civil law and order, and assuring 
the safe return of refugees.173 
The U.N. appointed former President of Finland Martti Ahtisaari as 
Special Envoy to Kosovo to assist in determining Kosovo’s future sta-
tus.174 In March 2007, Ahtisaari released the Comprehensive Proposal for 
the Kosovo Status Settlement,175 which called for “[i]ndependence with 
international supervision.”176 Serbia refused to accept the plan, and addi-
tional Russian resistance led to the plan’s demise, as the Security Council 
ultimately failed to adopt it.177 With frustration at its peak among the 
people of Kosovo, the members of the Kosovo Assembly took it upon 
themselves to officially announce the territory’s independence.178 
Even though the international community recognized that Kosovo’s 
Albanians were subjected to gross human rights violations,179 it consis-
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tently upheld Serbia’s right to territorial integrity.180 It may have been 
this failure to balance Serbia’s interest in territorial integrity with Koso-
vo’s right to self-determination that led to Kosovo’s declaration of inde-
pendence. 
Furthermore, other relevant factors moved the sliding scale balance in 
favor of independence. From the time Serbia seized control of Kosovo, 
there was a clear expression of the supermajority’s preference. In a 1991 
referendum held in Kosovo, the population overwhelmingly voted for 
independence from Serbia.181 There were also attempts at peaceful nego-
tiations as well; Resolution 1160182 and the Ahtisaari Plan serve as ex-
amples of attempts at peaceful resolution of the crisis.183 
Currently, 62 out of 192 United Nations member states formally rec-
ognize Kosovo.184 While it may at first seem that the international com-
munity has failed to recognize Kosovo’s independence, this statistic is 
deceptive. The 62 countries that recognize Kosovo’s independence make 
up 71.7% of the world’s total nominal GDP.185 Furthermore, 3 out of 5 
U.N. Security Council Permanent Member States, 24 out of 28 NATO 
Member States, and 22 out of 27 European Union Member States recog-
nize Kosovo.186 Arguably, international harmony is promoted by Koso-
vo’s independence because a large and influential percentage of the in-
ternational community does in fact recognize Kosovo’s independence. 
Plagued by high unemployment, a need for major infrastructure, and 
limited economic growth, Kosovo currently faces immense challenges 
for economic development.187 Kosovo must focus on building a strong, 
healthy, and self-sustaining economy for itself if it wishes to survive as 
an independent state. Fortunately, Kosovo has extensive assets, such as 
“rich mineral resources, a young and resilient population, and a robust 
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drive to succeed.”188 Additionally, with the announcement of Kosovo’s 
final status, business will likely be less reluctant to invest there and in-
ternational financial institutions, including the World Bank and Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, will be able to offer monetary assistance.189 Koso-
vo’s economy also improved with the arrival of the U.N. Interim Admin-
istration Mission (“UNMIK”) in Kosovo. Within a year of UNMIK’s 
arrival, Kosovo’s economy was described as “remarkably vibrant” by the 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Bernard Kouchner.190 
Kosovo’s private enterprises surpassed 1998 pre-war production and em-
ployment levels,191 construction was deemed “booming,” and “winter 
wheat planting was at 80% of the historical average.”192 Ironically, this 
progress was attributed to several unusually bold administrative deci-
sions made by Special Representative Kouchner, which arguably ex-
ceeded his mandate as set forth in Resolution 1244.193 Although much of 
this progress was hindered by the ongoing struggle over Kosovo’s final 
status, it does suggest that bold decisions by the leaders of Kosovo may 
lead to economic viability. 
The challenges facing Kosovo will take years to overcome. For Koso-
vo to succeed, it must learn from other states that have gone through an 
economic transformation. The experience of post-Communist states in 
the 1990s may prove a helpful guide for Kosovo’s democratic transfor-
mation. For example, a democratic transformation requires a modernized 
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banking system including credit, financial regulators, and an insurance 
system.194 Furthermore, as the experience of post-communist countries 
shows, a flat tax reduces corruption,195 which in turn will increase the 
flow of money and investment into Kosovo.196 With bold decision-
making and adherence to proven models, Kosovo may become a self-
sustaining economy in the long term. 
All in all, while the legitimacy of Kosovo’s declaration of indepen-
dence was not clear-cut, it was certainly not an open-and-shut case if 
analyzed in light of the totality of the circumstances. While it is true that 
its people suffered grave human rights abuses under the Serbian regime, 
Kosovo resorted to violent resistance rather than peaceful settlement of 
its disputes. However, Kosovo’s expression of supermajority will for 
independence was present as early as 1992 during the referendum for 
independence. While bleak, the economic viability of Kosovo as an in-
dependent state is not out of the question. The transition period to full 
independent statehood will be difficult, but the circumstances surround-
ing its secession suggest that it has the potential and ability to become 
self-sufficient. Finally, while only 62 out of 192 U.N. Member States 
formally recognize Kosovo’s independence, those Members do represent 
70.94% of the world’s total nominal GDP. 
These circumstances surrounding Kosovo’s declaration may have in-
deed shifted the sliding scale of independence far enough that Serbia’s 
then-existing Political Liberty Triangle could no longer sustain itself and 
collapsed. As a result, Kosovo formed its own Political Liberty Triangle 
and Serbia’s Political Liberty Triangle repairs itself without Kosovo. 
C. Reconciling East Timor with Kosovo 
How does one reconcile independence for Kosovo under the Political 
Liberty Triangle paradigm, but not for East Timor? Both territories suf-
fered from subjugation, exploitation, and domination. Gross, systematic, 
and extensive human rights violations marked both territories. There was 
also evidence of attempts at peaceful negotiations, violent resistance, and 
expressions by both supermajorities of their wills to secede. The eco-
nomic instability present in East Timor at the time it seceded can also be 
seen in Kosovo at the time it seceded, and international harmony was 
promoted in both cases. 
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However, under the Political Liberty Triangle paradigm, Kosovo 
shifted on the sliding scale of independence to a much greater extent than 
East Timor largely because Kosovo was a “unique situation.”197 U.N. 
Security Council Resolution 1244 established the U.N. Interim Adminis-
tration Mission in 1999 in Kosovo to promote democratic self-
government and “facilit[e] a political process designed to determine Ko-
sovo’s future status.”198 The situation in Kosovo involved an unprece-
dented level of participation by the United Nations and NATO not 
present in East Timor’s circumstances.199 Additionally, since the breakup 
of the former Yugoslavia, Kosovo has had independent status even while 
under the control of Serbia—meanwhile, East Timor never possessed 
independent status. As such, Kosovo’s independence was the natural 
progression of Yugoslavia’s breakup, as all people in the former Yugos-
lavia were given their right to self-determination.200 
The circumstances surrounding secession in Kosovo and East Timor 
were important considerations that factored into an examination of the 
heart of the Political Liberty Triangle and may have justified secession 
for Kosovo, but not East Timor. Ultimately, all circumstances surround-
ing a state’s claim to secession are appropriate to analyze under the Polit-
ical Liberty Triangle paradigm. 
Returning for a moment to East Timor—one might question what al-
ternative solutions to independence were available. While East Timor’s 
independence in 2002 is illegitimate under the Political Liberty Triangle, 
independence may in fact have shifted toward legitimacy within years 
had East Timor sought further peaceful negotiations and more U.N. in-
volvement and continued to develop its economy. The purpose of the 
Political Liberty Triangle paradigm is to allow for secession only in 
unique situations, and the overarching aim of this new approach is to 
maintain a balance between sovereignty and self-determination. If lack-
ing insistence on the necessity of that balance, any paradigm would be 
flawed. 
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CONCLUSION 
The power of an accurate paradigm is that it explains, and then it 
guides.201 Presently, the international community’s paradigm focuses on 
self-determination to determine the lawfulness of a claim to secession. 
This outdated approach explains why secession might be justified, but it 
does not explain how that conclusion is ultimately to be reached. The 
failure of this approach (with respect to its lack of guidance) may be at-
tributed to the lack of any international norm that defines self-
determination. 
Alternatively, as this article has demonstrated through case studies of 
East Timor and Kosovo, the Political Liberty Triangle and the sliding 
scale of independence provide analytical guidance. This approach can be 
used to explain why a group will seek secession in the name of self-
determination. More importantly, however, it has the potential of guiding 
scholars, advocates, and other decision-makers to a proper conclusion 
whenever the legitimacy of a claim to secession is in dispute. 
Unfortunately, like old habits, paradigms die hard.202 Without an accu-
rate paradigm, the confusion and complex issues that have evolved in 
regard to the doctrine of secession will not fade. It helps to think of a 
paradigm as a map.203 If a scholar’s “map” is inaccurate, the scholar will 
remain lost regardless of how long and hard the scholar searches for his 
or her destination. However, with an accurate map, scholars can reach 
their desired destinations with sufficiently rigorous and proper reasoning 
and analysis. The Political Liberty Triangle is the best heuristic “map” 
for answering the question: When is secession lawful? 
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